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Horgan and Timmons, with their Moral Twin Earth arguments, argue 
that the new moral realism falls prey to either objectionable relativism 
or referential indeterminacy. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment 
on which the arguments are based relies in crucial ways on the use of 
intuitions. First, it builds on Putnam’s well-known Twin Earth example 
and the conclusions drawn from that about the meaning of kind names. 
Further, it relies on the intuition that were Earthers and Twin Earthers 
to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. I will 
argue that the similarities with Putnam’s thought experiment are ques-
tionable and so the reliance on Putnam-like intuitions is questionable. I 
will then further argue that even if we accept the intuitions that Horgan 
and Timmons rely on, the anti-realist conclusion is not warranted due 
to there being more to the meaning of kind terms than the argument 
assumes. Once we develop the meaning of kind terms further we can 
acknowledge both that Earthers and Twin Earthers refer to different 
properties with their moral terms, and that in spite of that they can have 
a substantive disagreement due to a shared meaning component.
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Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles 
where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the 
new moral realism (Horgan & Timmons 1990).1 The new moral realism 
is based on advances made in the philosophy of language. Suppose, the 
argument goes, that a causal theory of reference of the kind advanced 
by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, to name two of the usual suspects, 
is true. Suppose further that moral terms, such as ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘kind’, 
and ‘just’ are kind terms which reference is determined causally and 
1 Later articles include (Horgan & Timmons, 1992a, 1992b, 2000, 2009).
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that they are rigid designators so that they refer to the same kinds/
objects in all worlds in which they exist. Given this, it seems that the 
new moral realist has at her disposal synthetic defi nitions of moral 
terms. Just as we can say that “water is H2O” is necessary and a pos-
teriori, it seems that we can now provide similar defi nitions for moral 
terms, namely defi nitions that identify moral properties with natural 
properties. Such defi nitions would be necessarily true and at the same 
time only knowable a posteriori. This way of approaching moral real-
ism, namely through the advances in philosophy of language and the 
causal theory of reference, should provide the new moral realist with 
ammunition to counter some of the traditional objections against moral 
naturalism.
The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on 
the use of intuitions. First, as Horgan and Timmons frequently point 
out, it builds on Putnam’s well-known Twin Earth thought experiment 
and the conclusions drawn from that thought experiment about the 
meaning of kind names. Further, it relies on the intuition that were 
Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genu-
ine moral disagreements.
I will argue that the dissimilarities with Putnam’s thought experi-
ment are signifi cant and so the reliance on Putnam-like intuitions is 
questionable.2 I will then further argue that even if we accept the intu-
itions that Horgan and Timmons rely on, that is, even if we address the 
thought experiment and arguments on their own and apart from com-
parisons with Putnam’s example, the anti-realist conclusion is not war-
ranted. There are two main reasons for this. First, there is more to the 
meaning of kind terms than the argument assumes. That is, the basic 
intuitions that Twin Earth scenarios provide regarding the meaning of 
kind terms leave us with an incomplete account of meaning. Once we 
develop the meaning of kind terms further we can acknowledge that 
Earthers and Twin Earthers refer to different properties with their 
moral terms, and in spite of that they can have a substantive disagree-
ment due to a shared meaning component. Second, Horgan and Tim-
mons rely on the intuition that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to 
meet they would have genuine moral disagreement. Horgan and Tim-
mons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the 
relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue 
2 My objection will not rely on the differences that are developed in (Laurence, 
Margolis, Dawson 1999: 135–165) They argue that our intuitions on Putnam’s Twin 
Earth and Moral Twin Earth differ in three main respect. First, Putnam’s example 
deals with a fi ctional example while Moral Twin Earth deals with existing competing 
moral accounts. Second, given the similarities between Earthers and Twin Earthers 
they claim that there is a reason to believe that the moral properties on earth 
are instantiated on Twin Earth, and vice versa. In contrast, there is no XYZ on 
earth. Third, they point out that the relevant moral properties are functional, while 
Putnam’s example does not deal with functional properties.  Michael Rubin discusses 
these arguments and argues that they fail to introduce signifi cant complications for 
our intuitive judgment regarding Moral Twin Earth. See (Rubin 2008).
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that we can accept that they have genuine moral disagreement while 
at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents 
and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagree-
ments does not require that the semantic meaning, or the reference of 
the terms used in the debate be the same.
When Horgan and Timmons fi rst presented their thought experi-
ment and the arguments based on it they targeted specifi cally Richard 
Boyd and his causal account of reference. They have since stated that 
their thought experiment is a generic recipe that can be applied to virtu-
ally any metaphysically naturalistic version of moral realism (Horgan 
& Timmons 2009). While my concern in the bulk of the paper will not be 
with Boyd’s account of reference, I do discuss his account and argue that 
while his account is broadly causal, it differs signifi cantly from the Krip-
ke/Putnam model. Specifi cally, I will argue that Boyd’s causal account 
does not accommodate rigid designation and thus does not provide the 
framework needed for new wave moral realism to succeed.3
Causal reference and rigid designation
The description theory of reference holds that the reference of a name 
is mediated via content. According to some of the more infl uential ver-
sions of the theory a given name has a descriptive meaning, and the 
name refers to whatever object best satisfi es the majority of the descrip-
tions that comprise  the meaning of the relevant name. For example, 
the name ‘Thales’ has a meaning, and whatever object best satisfi es 
the meaning is Thales. If, for example, the meaning of ‘Thales’ is “the 
Greek philosopher who held that all is water,” then the name refers to 
the Greek philosopher who held that all is water, whoever that was.
Against the description theory Kripke, Donnellan, Barcan-Marcus, 
Putnam, and Kaplan, to name a few, advanced the causal theory of 
reference. One of the main accomplishments of the causal theory of 
reference was to separate the connection between content and refer-
ence, showing that a mode of presentation does not determine refer-
ence. Advocates of the causal theory of reference argued that a name 
is connected to an object via an initial act of baptism, and the object 
named is the semantic meaning of the name. When the name is passed 
from one language user to the next it retains its reference as long as the 
language users intend to use the name with the same reference it had 
when passed to them. As an example, there is a causal chain that con-
nects our use of ‘Thales’ to the initial baptism of Thales, thus maintain-
ing the reference of the name. Whether or not the person at the tail end 
of the chain held that all is water is inconsequential for the reference 
of the name to succeed. Instead of reference being mediated through 
content the name refers to the person at the end of the causal chain.
3 My arguments here regarding Boyd will be brief. For more extended arguments 
see (Geirsson 2005).
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An important feature of the causal theory of names is that names 
are not only direct, but also rigid designators, meaning that they refer 
to the same objects in all possible worlds (in which they exist). Rigidity 
helps explain how it is that true identity statements, such as “Sam-
uel Clemens is Mark Twain,” are necessarily true, if true. If ‘Samuel 
Clemens’ and ‘Mark Twain’ are rigid designators, then they designate 
the same object in all possible worlds (in which Clemens exists). Given 
that, there will be no worlds in which Clemens is not Twain and so it is 
necessarily true that Clemens is Twain.
The causal theory of reference has also been used to argue that 
natural kind terms refer directly and are rigid designators. Suppose I 
decide to call a type of liquid ‘water’ and then fi nd out that this type of 
liquid has an atomic structure H2O. Since ‘water’ is a rigid designator 
that refers to the same type of material in all possible worlds in which it 
exists, ‘water’ refers to water in all possible worlds (in which water ex-
ists). It might be the case that water has different phenomenal proper-
ties in different worlds. It might, for example, be green in some worlds. 
But just as it was contingently true that Thales held that all is water, 
it is contingently true that water has the phenomenal properties it has, 
such as being a clear liquid in this world and a green liquid in some 
possible world. What makes water water is its atomic structure, not its 
phenomenal qualities. Since water has the atomic structure H2O, it has 
that atomic structure in all possible worlds. That is, it is a necessary 
truth that water is H2O. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to say that 
it is true in virtue of the meaning of the words that water is H2O, for it 
took substantial research to uncover the fact that water is H2O.
Notice that a requirement for names being rigid designators is that 
their reference is not mediated via content that needs to be satisfi ed in 
a way specifi ed by the description theory of reference. If the reference 
of a name is mediated via some content, as description theories of refer-
ence suggest, then the content determining reference leads to reference 
being unstable across worlds. For example, if the meaning of ‘water’ 
is given as a disjunction of descriptions that describe its phenomenal 
properties on earth, then a liquid that satisfi es those descriptions on 
Twin Earth would be the referent of ‘water’ in spite of the liquid not be-
ing H2O. That is, the name ‘water’ would not be rigid. Similarly, if the 
reference of ‘water’ is somehow regulated by its phenomenal or func-
tional properties such that its reference (causally) tracks the relevant 
phenomenal or functional properties, then, as I will argue, a different 
substance with identical phenomenal or functional properties would 
be the referent of the term in a world where such a substance exists. 
Hence, the name ‘water’ would not be rigid.
Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment provides some of 
the most infl uential insights on the meaning of kind names. Horgan 
and Timmons frequently invoke Putnam’s thought experiment. They 
want to produce a Moral Twin Earth example that is such that a “re-
fl ection on this scenario generates intuitive judgments that are compa-
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rable to those concerning Putnam’s original scenario” (Horgan & Tim-
mons 2009: 5). Due to the role Putnam’s Twin Earth plays for Horgan 
and Timmons it is instructive to look more closely at the Twin Earth 
thought experiment. A close look will show that Putnam’s thought ex-
periment, as he uses it, is of no help to Horgan and Timmons. Instead a 
comparison is detrimental to Horgan’s and Timmons’ project.
Putnam’s Twin Earth
Putnam describes Twin Earth as follows:
Twin Earth is very much like Earth; in fact, people on Twin Earth even speak 
English. In fact, apart from the difference we shall specify in our science-fi c-
tion examples, the reader may suppose that Twin Earth is exactly like Earth. 
He may even suppose that he has a Doppelganger—an identical copy—on 
Twin Earth, if he wishes, although my stories will not depend on this.
Although some of the people on Twin Earth…speak English, there are, not 
surprisingly, a few tiny differences which we will now describe between the 
dialects of English spoken on Twin Earth and Standard English. These dif-
ferences themselves depend on some of the peculiarities of Twin Earth.
One of the peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the liquid called ‘water’ is not 
H2O but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and com-
plicated. I shall abbreviate this chemical formula simply as XYZ. I shall 
suppose that XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures 
and pressures. In particular, it tastes like water and it quenches thirst like 
water. Also, I shall suppose that the oceans and lakes and seas of Twin 
Earth contain XYZ and not water, that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and not 
water, etc. (Putnam 1975: 223)
There are four points or lessons that I want to draw from Putnam’s 
Twin Earth thought experiment and his use of it. All four points are 
relevant when discussing Moral Twin Earth.
Point 1: The issue of whether the names ‘watere’ and ‘watert’ have 
the same reference does not arise in Putnam’s Twin Earth thought ex-
periment. Instead, it is assumed that the two names differ in refer-
ence, namely ‘watere’ refers to H2O while ‘watert’ refers to XYZ. Putnam 
makes this clear throughout his writing, including in the following 
when he discusses what happens when Earthers who visit Twin Earth 
discover that the water-like liquid on Twin Earth in XYZ. 
If a spaceship from Earth ever visits Twin Earth, then the supposition at 
fi rst will be that ‘water’ has the same meaning on Earth and on Twin Earth. 
This supposition will be corrected when it is discovered that ‘water’ on Twin 
Earth is XYZ, and the Earthian spaceship will report somewhat as follows:
‘On Twin Earth the word “water” means XYZ.’ (Putnam 1975: 223)
Putnam goes on and states that “there is no problem about the ex-
tension of the term ‘water’.” (Putnam, 1975: 224) What we call ‘water’ 
simply is not water on Twin Earth, and what they call ‘water’ simply is 
not water on Earth.
Point 2. The referent of a kind name does not constitute its full 
meaning according to Putnam. The referent of a kind name constitutes 
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a part of the meaning of a kind name, but there is more to their mean-
ing than what they denote. Putnam makes this clear when he writes 
“…note that although ‘means’ does mean something like has as exten-
sion in this [Twin Earth] example, one would not say
‘On Twin Earth the meaning of the word “water” is XYZ.’
Unless, possibly, the fact that ‘water is XYZ’ was known to every adult 
speaker of English on Twin Earth.” (Putnam 1975: 224)
Given that many followers of the causal theory of names have ar-
gued that the meaning of names of individual objects is their referent, 
Putnam’s use of the ‘means’ and ‘meaning’ is unfortunate, as it some-
times suggests that Putnam is claiming that the meaning of a kind 
name it its referent. But that is not so. Other factors constitute parts of 
the meaning of kind names on Putnam’s account. In the case of water, 
the meaning of ‘watere ’ includes syntactic markers, such as the name 
being a mass noun, semantic markers, such as water being a natural 
kind and a liquid, stereotypes, such as water being colorless, tasteless, 
and fi nally its extension, namely H2O (Putnam 1975: 269).
Point 3. Psychological content does not determine reference. Putnam 
asks us to consider Oscar1, a typical Earthian who lived at around 1750, 
and Oscar2, a typical Twin Earthian who lived, of course, at the same 
time. At this time the typical Earthian did not know that water consist-
ed of hydrogen and oxygen, and the typical Twin Earthian did not know 
that watert consisted of XYZ. Suppose further that there is no belief 
that Oscar1 has about water that Oscar2 does not also have. The two of 
them are exact duplicates in feelings, thoughts, interior monologue, etc. 
Nevertheless, as Putnam points out, the extension (reference) of ‘water’ 
at that time was H2O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth. That is, psycho-
logical content, which is identical in Oscar1 and Oscar2 when it comes to 
water, does not determine reference. (Putnam 1975: 224)
Point 4. Kind terms are rigid designators. That is, a kind term re-
fers to the same kind in all possible worlds in which the kind exists.4 
Simple as it is, this lesson is very important. It is rigid designation that 
provides for the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths, or synthetic 
defi nitions. Rigidity provides kind terms with the stability needed to 
make the relevant statements true in all possible worlds, or necessar-
ily true. Without rigidity synthetic defi nitions are not possible and so 
without rigidity new-wave moral realism is not possible. Any semantic 
theory that gives up rigidity takes away any hope for synthetic defi ni-
tions, which are the backbone of new-wave moral realism.
Moral Twin Earth
Horgan and Timmons claim that the Moral Twin Earth thought ex-
periment crucially depends on a key assumption about semantic intu-
itions:
4 See for example (Putnam 1975: 231).
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SI: Competent users of language have an intuitive mastery of se-
mantic norms.
They frequently cite Putnam’s Twin Earth and the intuitive agree-
ment we have that ‘water’ on Earth and Twin Earth refer to different 
substances as an example of the intuitive mastery that we have of se-
mantic norms. They clearly intend their thought experiment to closely 
resemble Putnam’s thought experiment. In particular, they want their 
thought experiment to test the same intuitive judgments as does Put-
nam’s Twin Earth example.
Moral Twin Earth is very much like Earth. The geography and sur-
roundings are the same, and the Twin Earthers who live in Twin Aus-
tralia and Twin U.S.A. speak Twin English which sounds the same as 
it does on earth. It is of particular importance that Moral Twin Earth-
ers use moral vocabulary in much the same way as Earthers. The Eng-
lish speaking Moral Twin Earthers use terms like ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘bad’, 
and ‘wrong’ when evaluating acts and institutions. In particular, these 
terms are used to reason about the wellbeing of the population on Moral 
Twin Earth. Were a group of explorers from Moral Earth to visit Twin 
Earth then they would be inclined to accept the natives moral terms as 
identical to their own. So similar is their use.
In spite of all the similarities between Earth and Moral Twin Earth 
there is a crucial difference between the two. Upon investigation into 
Twin Earthers moral discourse and practice we fi nd that Moral Twin 
Earthers use of moral terms is causally regulated by some deontologi-
cal moral properties and so Moral Twin Earthers converge to deonto-
logical morality. Earthers use of moral terms, on the other hand, is 
causally regulated by consequentialist moral properties and so Earth-
ers converge to consequentialist morality. Moral Twin Earthers moral 
theory is best systematized with a deontological theory Td while Earth-
ers moral theory is best systematized with a consequentialistic theory 
Tc. In spite of the different theories Horgan and Timmons suggest that 
the two theories are similar enough so that moral discourse in the two 
places operates in much the same manner. The differences in the mo-
ralities of Earthers and Moral Twin Earthers, Horgan and Timmons 
suggest, are in part due to certain species-wide psychological tempera-
ment that differs between the two. For example, they suggest, Moral 
Twin Earthers might experience certain sentiments, such as guilt, 
more frequently and more intensely than Earthers, and they might 
experience sympathy to a lesser degree than Earthers (Horgan & Tim-
mons 2009: 7). However, the main reason for the difference in morality 
is that on Earth peoples use of moral terms is causally regulated by 
consequentialistic moral properties while on Moral Twin Earth peoples 
use of moral terms is causally regulated by deontological moral proper-
ties.
Given this description of Moral Twin Earth, what is the appropriate 
way to describe the differences between moral and twin-moral uses of 
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moral terms, such as ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘bad’, ‘fair’, etc.? Horgan and Tim-
mons claim that two options are available. On the one hand, one could 
say that the differences we encounter with Earth and Moral Twin 
Earth are analogous to those between Putnam’s Earth and Twin Earth, 
namely that moral terms used by Earthers and moral terms used by 
Moral Twin Earthers refer to different moral properties. If that is so, 
then moral terms on Earth and Moral Twin Earth differ in meaning 
and are not intertranslatable. On the other hand, one could say that 
moral and twin-moral terms do not differ in meaning.  If that is so, then 
any apparent moral disagreement between Earthers and Moral Twin 
Earthers would be a genuine disagreement. That is, it would be a dis-
agreement in moral belief and in moral theory rather than a mere dif-
ference in meaning. Horgan and Timmons submit that the natural and 
plausible alternative is the second one. That is, Horgan and Timmons 
claim that the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth differ from 
the intuitions generated by Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment 
as in the former, and not the latter, we want to say that the relevant 
terms have the same meaning.5
The main differences between 
Putnam’s Twin Earth and Moral Twin Earth
When Horgan and Timmons presented Moral Twin Earth they made 
references to Putnam’s original Twin Earth example and claimed that 
the intuitions that we draw upon with the Moral Twin Earth thought 
experiment are, in essence, the same as those elicited by Putnam’s 
thought experiment. My contention is that they are wrong on this. Let 
us look at the various lessons drawn from Putnam’s case and fi nd out 
whether they apply to the Moral Twin Earth scenario.
Point 1 applied. In Putnam’s example the issue of what the relevant 
terms refer to did not arise. It was assumed all along that ‘watere’ and 
‘watert’ refer to different substances. In the Moral Twin Earth example 
the issue of disagreement and what it means for reference is a focal 
point. Horgan and Timmons initially assume that moral terms are caus-
ally regulated by different moral properties on Earth and Moral Twin 
Earth. However, given our intuitive judgment that Earthers and Moral 
Twin Earthers can have a genuine moral disagreement we conclude 
that moral terms mean the same on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, and 
hence that the initial assumption about causal regulation (reference) 
is false. Since it is not the case that moral terms are causally regulated 
by the different moral properties on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, the 
relevant moral properties are not a part of the meaning of moral terms. 
The argument, which we can call The Argument from Disagreement, 
can be stated as follows:
5 See for example (Horgan & Timmons 2009: 9).
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1. If ‘watere’ and watert’ refer to different kinds/properties, then 
Earthers and Moral Twin Earthers would not be able to have genu-
ine moral disagreements.
2. Earthers and Moral Twin Earthers can have genuine moral dis-
agreements.
3. So, ‘watere’ and watert’ do not refer to different kinds/properties.
It is worth noting that the intuitions appealed to here by Horgan 
and Timmons have nothing to do with our competent grasp of semantic 
norms. That is, they do not appeal to intuitions about reference. In-
stead, after consulting our intuitions regarding disagreements Horgan 
and Timmons infer that ‘watere’ and watert’ do not refer to different 
kinds or properties. Putnam, on the other hand, makes no use of in-
tuitions regarding disagreements in his Twin Earth thought experi-
ment and he does not conclude anything about reference from the issue 
of disagreement. There is therefore a clear disanalogy here between 
Putnam’s use of Twin Earth and Horgan and Timmons’ use of Moral 
Twin Earth. Even more seriously, as I will argue in the next section, 
The Argument from Disagreements is not sound. Aligning the issues of 
reference and disagreements, as we will then see, is a mistake that we 
fi nd in Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiment 
but not in Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment.
Point 2 applied. As Putnam made very clear in his discussion of the 
Twin Earth thought experiment, the referent of a kind term does not 
constitute the term’s full meaning. Instead the referent is a part of its 
meaning. Other elements of the meaning of ‘water’ include it being a 
mass noun, it being a natural kind and a liquid, and it being colorless 
and tasteless. Notice that ‘watere’ and ‘watert’ share much, and perhaps 
most of their meaning. The reference of the two differ, but the remain-
ing elements of their meaning are the same. Like H2O, XYZ is a natural 
kind, it is colorless and tasteless, it is a liquid, and ‘watert’ is a mass 
noun as is ‘watere’. Given how much of the meaning of ‘watere’ and ‘wa-
tert’ is shared, we can probably say that to a large extent they have the 
same meaning although their reference differs.
Once we recognize that there is a large shared meaning between the 
two terms, then that opens the door for genuine disagreements to arise 
about watert between Earthers who visit Twin Earth and Twin Earth-
ers even if the two names have different reference. The kind terms need 
not have exactly the same meaning in order for a genuine disagreement 
to arise. It suffi ces that there is a signifi cant overlap of meaning.
In order to see that a signifi cant disagreement can arise in spite 
of the terms involved not sharing their full meaning consider moral 
disagreements that we have on Earth. A virtue ethicist, a deontologist, 
a moral pluralist, and someone who accepts a teleological approach 
understand moral terms in somewhat different ways. Each theory im-
plies an understanding of key moral concepts and the differences in 
understanding between, for example, a deontologist and a teleologist 
100 H. Geirsson, Moral Twin Earth, Intuitions, and Kind Terms
are fairly signifi cant. For example, one places the concept good and 
the other the concept right at the foundation of her moral reasoning, 
and one evaluates acts by their consequences while the other focuses 
more on duties. Consequently, it is reasonable to claim that when a 
consequentialist says that an act is right she means something differ-
ent by the term ‘right’ than does a deontologist who makes the same 
utterance. In spite of these differences in moral theories on Earth and 
the corresponding differences in the meaning of moral terms we still 
manage to have signifi cant and genuine moral disagreement.
What is more pertinent to the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment 
is the possibility of a disagreement arising in spite of the names used 
in the debate referring to different substances or properties in different 
worlds, that is, without the names having the same semantic meaning. 
The way in which such disagreements can arise relies on speakers being 
able to use words to refer to something other than they denote.6 Keith 
Donnellan and Saul Kripke provided numerous examples of such di-
vergence between semantic reference and speaker reference.7 Someone 
can, for example, use the description “the man drinking a martini” to 
refer to someone she, mistakenly, believes is drinking a martini. In fact 
the man has water in his glass. (Donnellan, 1966) Same goes for names. 
If I mistake Peter for Paul, then I can use the name ‘Paul’ to refer to 
Peter. My respondents might understand who I am referring to and 
so we might have a discussion about the person, namely Peter, while 
all the time using the name ‘Paul’. Similarly, an Earther visiting Twin 
Earth can easily use ‘water’ to refer to watert and so an Earther and a 
Twin Earther can use ‘water’ to refer to the same substance. An Earther 
visiting Twin Earth might look at a lake saying “the water in the lake is 
pristine,” thus referring to the watert in the lake. In the ensuing conver-
sation with a Twin Earther both may succeed in referring to the liquid 
in the lake, namely watert. The Twin Earther might even disagree with 
the Earther about the watert’s clarity and so a genuine disagreement 
might arise. It helps here how easy it is to mistake watert for watere. 
Watere and watert share a number of properties, including all of their 
phenomenal properties, and only a few of their known properties, given 
Putnam’s story, depend on the chemical composition of the two kinds.
Given the identical phenomenal properties of the two kinds and the 
identical and important roles that the two kinds play on their respec-
tive earths, it is easy to see Earthers and Twin Earthers have a heated 
discussion about, for example, how best to limit access to groundwater, 
how to clean polluted streams, how to control runoff, how to use tides 
to produce electricity, etc. They might also disagree about the aesthetic 
qualities of the moon refl ecting in a lake, or how thick the ice has to be 
before it is safe to walk across it.
6 I argue for this in greater detail in (Geirsson 2005).
7 See Donnellan’s and Kripke’s well-known examples (Donnellan 1966, Kripke 
1979).
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Suppose that after a long argument the Earthers visiting Twin 
Earth and the Twin Earthers come to an agreement on a brilliant solu-
tion about how best to control access to groundwater and how best to 
deliver it to faraway places. Suppose also that once they have reached 
this agreement, presented the solution, and received great phrase for 
its originality they fi nd out that water on Earth and Twin Earth are 
different kinds. Are we now to say that their disagreements and the 
subsequent solution is void and meaningless because they were all 
along talking about different substances? Of course not. The disagree-
ments were genuine and the subsequent solution remains brilliant. It 
does not matter here that watere and watert are different kinds. The 
disagreement and the successful subsequent solution refl ects the fact 
that the parties involved were successful in referring to the same sub-
stance and so had meaningful disagreements and conversations about 
that substance. What made the genuine disagreement possible is the 
fact that the two parties were able to use ‘water’ to refer to watert and 
so they managed to talk about the same substance, namely watert.. 
The point here is simple. Even if two terms refer to different objects/
kinds/properties, users of the terms can have genuine disagreements. It 
is suffi cient that the parties use their terms to refer to the same objects/
kind/property. So, the Argument from Disagreement is not sound.
Point 3 applied. The third lesson learned from Putnam’s Twin Earth, 
and arguably the most important point that Putnam makes with his 
Twin Earth example, is that psychological content does not determine 
reference. Oscar1 who lives on Earth and Oscar2 who is an inhabitant 
of Twin Earth have the same psychological content and nevertheless 
their typical utterances of the word ‘water’ refer to different substanc-
es. As with Point 1, the parallel between the two thought experiments 
breaks down. While Putnam stresses the point that Oscar1 and Oscar2 
have the same psychological content when it comes to the concept of 
water while the reference of ‘water’ nevertheless differs, Horgan and 
Timmons do no such thing. Instead, Horgan and Timmons specify that 
moral equilibrium plays a role in the formulation of the relevant mor-
al theories, and hence the formulation of moral concepts. Given that 
Earthers accept or are guided by a teleological theory while the Twin 
Earthers accept or are guided by a deontic theory the moral concepts 
differ regardless of the reference of the relevant moral terms. That is, 
the psychological content of Earthers and Moral Twin Earthers when it 
comes to moral concepts is not the same. This is a signifi cant departure 
from Putnam’s Twin Earth.
The departure regarding psychological content from Putnam’s 
thought experiment is signifi cant for two reasons. First, since Horgan 
and Timmons repeatedly claim to be drawing on the same intuitions in 
their thought experiment as Putman does in his, the relevant details 
in the two thought experiments need to be the same. A departure as 
serious as this one jeopardizes any meaningful comparison of the two 
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thought experiments. Second, and more signifi cantly, leaving aside any 
comparison with Putnam’s Twin Earth, the move threatens to under-
mine the main conclusion that Horgan and Timmons want to draw.
Horgan and Timmons claim that, unlike Putnam’s Twin Earth, 
Moral Twin Earth has us conclude that the relevant kind terms do 
not differ in meaning. Given how they set up the thought experiment 
it is hard to see how we can conclude that. Because moral equilibrium 
plays a role in forming the relevant moral theories and concepts, and 
because it is assumed that Earthers accept a teleological theory while 
Moral Twin Earthers accept a deontological theory, it is assumed from 
the start that moral terms on Earth and Moral Twin Earth differ in 
narrow meaning, that is, the part of meaning that resides within one’s 
head. A deontologist has different foundational concepts than does 
the teleologist, and a deontologist understands the concept of duty, to 
name one example, in a different way than does the teleologist. Given 
this it seems clear that Horgan and Timmons cannot conclude, as they 
do, that moral terms on Earth and Moral Twin Earth have the same 
meaning.
Horgan and Timmons may respond by pointing out that when they 
set up their thought experiment they are using ‘meaning’ as extension 
or reference. That is, they can claim that the crux of the example has 
to do with Earthers and Moral Twin Earthers using terms that have 
to refer to the same kind or properties if a genuine disagreement is to 
arise. But a response along these lines will not help their cause for the 
following reason. Consider these alternatives.
A: It is a necessary condition for a genuine disagreement to arise that 
the referring terms used in the debate refer to the same things.
The requirement set forth in (A) is too strong, as already shown. In-
stead of (A), the weaker (B) is preferable.
B: It is a necessary condition for a genuine disagreement to arise 
that the referring terms used in the debate are used to refer to the 
same things.
As we have already seen, terms can be used to refer to things and kinds 
that the terms themselves do not refer to. Hence the notion of speaker 
reference (setting it apart from semantic reference). But given (B) it is 
clear that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment does not show us 
that a genuine disagreement can arise only if moral terms refer to the 
same properties on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, assuming that there 
are such moral properties.
Point 4 applied. Putnam held that kind terms are rigid designators, 
namely that a given kind term refers to the same kind in all worlds in 
which that kind exists. Horgan and Timmons argue that moral terms 
on Earth and Moral Twin Earth have the same meaning. Since they 
have the same meaning and since, by hypothesis, moral properties on 
Earth and Moral Twin Earth differ (as our use of moral terms is caus-
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ally regulated by different properties on Earth and Moral Twin Earth), 
moral terms are not rigid designators. Since moral terms are not rigid 
designators, and since the synthetic defi nitions of the new moral real-
ism require that moral terms are rigid designators, the new moral real-
ism cannot get off the ground.8
If all we can do is point to intuitions regarding the rigidity of kind 
names, then we would probably have to stop at this point and simply 
acknowledge that there is a fundamental difference in intuitive insight. 
But we do not need to stop there. Both parties provide more than intui-
tive support for their views.
After presenting examples that support an initial view that kind 
names are rigid designators, Kripke and Putnam proceed to provide 
additional support. The support they provide consists mostly of argu-
ments showing that the assumption that kind names are rigid desig-
nators helps us gain new, deep, and interesting insights into the na-
ture of necessity and the relationships between necessary truths and 
a priori knowledge. The support consists, for example, of explaining 
why identity statements are necessarily true if true, and how certain 
defi nitions can be at the same time necessarily true and knowable only 
a posteriori. Additionally, the arguments helped us untangle the many 
notions associated with the concept of analyticity. One important step 
here was to make a rather sharp distinction between the metaphysi-
cal notions of necessity/contingently and the epistemic notions of a 
priori/a posteriori. Without these interesting and plausible results, the 
intuitive insight alone about the rigidity of kind names might not have 
amounted to much.
Horgan and Timmons do not rely on an intuition about the rigidity 
and/or reference of moral terms when presenting the main results of 
their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment. Instead, the intuition they 
rely on has to do with whether or not Earthers and Moral Twin Earther 
can have a genuine disagreement if they meet and start exchanging 
opinions about moral matters. Once we have the intuition that the two 
can have a genuine disagreement, Horgan and Timmons conclude that 
the moral terms have the same meaning on Earth as they do on Moral 
Twin Earth. As has already been shown, it does not follow from the 
premise that two persons have a genuine disagreement about an object 
or a property or a kind that the terms themselves used in the debate 
have to have that object of property or kind as their extension or refer-
ence. Other explanations are readily available, including pointing out 
that the disagreeing parties can use their terms to refer to object/prop-
erty/kind p even though the term itself does not refer to p, and pointing 
8 We can even reach a stronger conclusion here. If the meaning of moral terms 
is the same on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, and our use of moral terms is causally 
regulated by different properties on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, then those 
properties are not a part of the meaning of moral terms. That is, we get a conclusion 
that strongly opposes Putnam’s point that the referent of a kind term is a part of the 
meaning of that term.
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out that even though the extension of the two terms might differ, they 
can nevertheless share a substantial amount of their meaning. Given 
the interesting and plausible results from viewing kind names, in gen-
eral, as rigid designators, Horgan and Timmons need to do more than 
they have done so far to establish their conclusion that moral terms are 
not rigid and so differ in that respect from other kind terms.9
The Appeal of Moral Twin Earth.
The main conclusion that Horgan and Timmons draw from the Moral 
Twin Earth thought experiment is that the meaning of moral terms 
on Earth and Moral Twin Earth is the same. As a careful comparison 
between Putnam’s Twin Earth and Moral Twin Earth shows, Horgan 
and Timmons cannot get their conclusion by appealing to the same 
intuitions as did Putnam in his Twin Earth thought experiment. The 
differences between the two thought experiments are too great.
Further, we have uncovered that the main inference that Horgan 
and Timmons rely on, namely the move they make from genuine dis-
agreement to same meaning, relies on a false premise and hence an 
unsound argument and so their reasoning does not stand on its own. As 
already pointed out, Horgan and Timmons’ conclusion that the mean-
ing of moral terms is the same on Earth and Moral Twin Earth is not 
directly based on intuition. Instead, the conclusion is inferred from the 
intuition that Earthers and Moral Twin Earther would have genuine 
disagreements about moral issues. We can grant the intuitive insight 
about them having genuine disagreement. The conclusion that moral 
terms have the same meaning on Earth and Moral Twin Earth does not 
follow from that. Hence, we have uncovered that quite apart from the 
difference between the two thought experiments, the main move that 
Horgan and Timmons make rests on an unsound argument. Given this 
the question remains, why do so many accept the conclusion that Hor-
gan and Timmons want to draw from the Moral Twin Earth thought 
experiment?
One possible explanation is that many, if not most of those involved 
in the debate assume that the meaning of kind terms is their reference. 
It is fairly common for causal reference theorists to hold that the mean-
ing of names of individuals is their referent. For example, the mean-
ing of ‘Plato’ is Plato. But that view is rarely extended to kind names. 
The qua problem, namely the question of what the reference of a name 
is being fi xed to, has forced the inclusion of elements other than the 
kind itself in the meaning of kind terms, be those descriptive or other 
9 Interestingly some ethicists have suggested that moral terms are either 
functional terms, or that their reference is guided by some epistemic criteria. For 
the former, see for example (Brink 2001) For the latter, see for example (van Roojen 
2006). Both moves are non-starters for the new moral realist, since they sacrifi ce 
the idea of moral terms being rigid designators, and hence give up the possibility of 
synthetic defi nitions.
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cognitive elements.10 It is true that if ‘water’ on Earth and Moral Twin 
Earth have different extensions, then the two terms differ in meaning. 
But given that the meaning of kind terms is not exhausted by their 
reference, kind terms might share enough of their meaning so that a 
genuine disagreement can arise even if, unbeknownst to the disagree-
ing parties, the terms do not refer to the same kind.
A second possible explanation is that people mistakenly infer that if 
the terms themselves do not refer to the same kind or properties, then 
the disagreeing parties are talking about different things, or talking 
past each other, and so the disagreement is not genuine. Again, this ig-
nores the familiar distinction between speaker reference and semantic 
reference. That distinction makes it clear that the terms can be used 
by the speakers to refer to objects other than they designate. Since the 
Earthers and Moral Twin Earthers can use their terms to refer to the 
same kind they can have a genuine disagreement about it.
A third possible explanation might be that those who are persuaded 
by Moral Twin Earth are subjectivists about moral values to begin with 
and are predisposed to fi nd any realist account of ethics implausible. 
Such predisposition might make them too agreeable to Horgan’s and 
Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiment. But as often is the 
case with thought experiments, the description of Moral Twin Earth is 
brief and a number of detail are left out. Once we start to think more 
carefully about the thought experiment we realize that complex issues 
of reference and meaning cloud the issue and we recognize that the fre-
quently cited Twin Earth thought experiment differs in signifi cant way 
from the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment and so the intuitions 
that drive one cannot be applied to the other.
The Speculative Nature of New Wave Moral Realism.
The new wave moral realism started with Richard Boyd’s speculative 
account of moral properties being homeostatic cluster properties that 
causally regulate our use of moral terms. (Boyd 1988) The account is 
speculative because Boyd does not set out to argue that moral realism 
is true, and he does not argue that moral properties are in fact homeo-
static cluster properties or natural properties. Rather, he suggests that 
the roadmap he provides is one way a realist argument might go. He 
relies on a causal account of reference and the possibility of synthetic 
defi nitions. However, his account of reference, which he now calls the 
accommodationist conception of reference to distinguish it from causal 
accounts proper, differs signifi cantly from those of the typical causal 
theorists, such as those of Kripke and Putnam. (Boyd 2010) In particu-
lar, he suggests that our use of moral terms is causally regulated by 
moral properties. “[T]he accommodationist conception differs from oth-
er causal conceptions of reference…by emphasizing the causal role of 
10 For a useful discussion of these issues see (Stanford & Kitcher 1997).
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actual conceptual, descriptive, and intentional practices.” (Boyd 2010: 
224) All of these have it in common, Boyd claims, that they play a role 
in how we understand kind terms, and the role they play is causal since 
they are relevant to the cognitive and social practices that help deter-
mine the meaning of kind terms.
The accommodationist conception of reference with its introduction 
of causal regulation is a signifi cant departure from the causal account 
of reference as developed by, for example, Kripke and Putnam. The 
latter emphasizes our use of names being linked to an object or a kind 
via a causal chain after the reference has been fi xed. Causal regulation, 
on the other hand, emphasizing actual conceptual, descriptive, and in-
tentional practices, is more likely to track phenomenal properties than 
kinds. If a term tracks kind K in the actual world, and kind Q has the 
phenomenal properties of kind K in world W and kind K, if it exists in 
W has different phenomenal properties than it does in the actual world, 
then the accomodationist account of reference has us refer to Q at W 
when using the term.
How does, for example, Putnam’s use of ‘water’ compare and con-
trast with Boyd’s accomodationist conception of reference? Consider 
an Earther who travels to Putnam’s Twin Earth and, unaware of the 
chemical composition of watert, uses ‘water’ when communicating with 
Twin Earthers about the clear liquid in lakes and rivers. His use of 
‘water’ while on Twin Earth is causally regulated by watert. Unable to 
detect any difference between watere and watert, his use of ‘water’ seam-
lessly fi ts in with his use of the term prior to arriving at Moral Twin 
Earth. This becomes even more obvious if we consider this taking place 
at around 1750, when it is clear that the phenomenal properties of the 
respective liquids regulate our use of the terms. The visitors concep-
tual, descriptive, and intentional practices when using the term have 
not changed, since she believes that the liquid on Moral Twin Earth 
is the same as it is on Earth. Following Boyd we should then conclude 
that ‘water’ in the mouth of the Earther now refers to watert. But this is 
exactly what Putnam denied in his Twin Earth example. On Putnam’s 
account the Earther and the Twin Earther refer to different substanc-
es. The key difference between the two accounts is that Putnam, as do 
most causal theorist, claims that kind names are not just causal desig-
nators but also rigid designators. That is, they refer to the same kind 
in all possible worlds in which that kind exists. The accommodationist 
conception of reference, with its causal regulation of use of kind terms, 
gives up rigidity.11 The reason is simple. If our use of a kind name is 
causally regulated in the way Boyd specifi es, namely by the relevant 
cognitive and social practices and with our engagement with the world, 
then our use of the name tracks properties that govern our use of the 
name. Those properties are typically the phenomenal and functional 
properties of the kind. For example, our everyday use of ‘water’ would 
11 I discuss this in greater detail in (Geirsson 2005).
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be causally regulated by the phenomenal properties of a liquid, namely 
look, feel, taste, etc., as well as its various functional roles. Since ‘water’ 
tracks properties that govern our use, on the accommodationist concep-
tion of reference, and since the properties that govern our use belong 
to different kinds on Earth and Twin Earth, ‘water’ refers to different 
kinds on Earth and Twin Earth. Rigid designation is not preserved.
Similarly, our use of ‘good’ and other moral terms would be caus-
ally regulated by facts about human well-being. The properties that 
contribute to human well-being might be teleological on Earth and de-
ontological on Moral Twin Earth, in which case moral terms would be 
causally regulated by different properties on Earth and Moral Twin 
Earth and so refer to different properties on Earth and Twin Earth. It 
is this kind of use that Putnam warns against when he claims that we 
should not mistake such “operational defi nitions,” namely defi nitions 
that depend on our use of the term, for the real meaning of the term 
(Putnam 1975).
But, the objection might go, any account of reference can be rigidi-
fi ed. Perhaps that is so, but doing so sometimes has consequences that 
are not wanted. Suppose that we somehow rigidify Boyd’s account of 
reference. For example, we might index reference to causal regulation 
at a world so that, for example, the name ‘water’ used by an Earther 
on Earth refers to what causally regulates her use of the word at the 
actual world. If we do this, then ‘water’ in the mouth of an Earther who 
visits Twin Earth refers to watere. However, once we do this then we 
change the role of causal regulation that Boyd uses. Instead of ‘water’ 
referring to whatever it is that causally regulates our use of the term, 
it refers to whatever it is that causally regulates our use of the term at 
the actual world. That is, it is now part of the meaning of ‘water’ that 
is refers to what causally regulates it in the actual world. And now we 
can raise a problem for the rigidifi ed account. Suppose there is a Per-
fect Earth, namely a possible world that, unlike Twin Earth and Moral 
Twin Earth, is exactly like Earth in every way. My duplicate on Perfect 
Earth uses ‘water’ and the term refers to what causally regulates the 
term on Perfect Earth. Consequently, it is a part of the meaning of 
‘water’ as used by my twin that it refers to what causally regulates his 
use of the term at Perfect Earth. But now, contrary to our intuitive 
judgment, when I think that water is quenching and when by twin on 
Perfect Earth thinks that water is quenching, then our thoughts have 
different contents. My though is partly about the actual world while my 
twins thought is partly about Perfect Earth. That is, even though we 
are thinking about the same kind or substance our thoughts are differ-
ent because they are entertained at different worlds. 12 This certainly 
goes counter to the intuitions that, for example, Putnam relied on when 
it came to kind terms and so we cannot rigidify Boyd’s account of refer-
ence in this way.
12 The example here is an abbreviated version of Scott Soames’ main argument 
against rigidifi ed descriptivism in (Soames 2002).
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The relevant point of disagreement between the causal account of 
reference and the accomodationist conception of reference boils down to 
this. The causal account of reference, as developed by Kripke and Put-
nam, tracks kinds. Since the causal account of reference tracks kinds, 
it can support rigid designation. The causal regulation of the accommo-
dationist conception tracks properties that govern our use of the term 
and so is more likely to track phenomenal or functional properties and 
our engagement with the world as governed by our social and cognitive 
practices, meaning that the same term might designate different kinds 
at different possible worlds. As a result, the accommodationist concep-
tion does not support rigid designation.
David Brink’s account of names has similar results. He provides a 
functional account of reference in his attempt to explain the reference 
of moral terms. For example, the word ‘milk’, he argues, should be re-
garded as a functional term. Even though the chemical composition of 
the white liquid that mammals produce to feed their young differs on 
Earth and Twin Earth, both are milk, since they serve the same func-
tion on the respective earths. Consequently, the word ‘milk’ refers to 
the respective liquid in both places even though their chemical com-
position differs and ‘milk’ has the same meaning on Earth and Twin 
Earth. This example paves the way to treat other kind terms, such as 
moral terms, as being functional terms. However, this account also has 
the consequence for the new moral realist that reference is not stable 
across worlds, which is what rigidity requires. ‘Water’ on earth refers 
to H2O while it refers to XYZ on Twin Earth.13 However, since the liq-
uid on Twin Earth is functionally equivalent to water on Earth, ‘water’, 
on Brink’s account, would have the same meaning on Earth and Twin 
Earth. Not only does this go against Putnam’s original insight. This 
has the results that we lose rigidity, since ‘water’ now refers to differ-
ent substances on Earth and Twin Earth. Without rigidity we do not 
have and synthetic defi nitions. And without synthetic defi nitions the 
new moral realism does not get off the ground.
If we give up causal regulation and functional accounts of names in 
favor of an account that preserves rigid designation, then the would-be 
moral realist faces a different kind of a problem, and that is how to fi x 
the reference of a name of an object or a property that might not exist. 
The causal account of reference faces diffi cult problems when it comes 
to non-referring terms and, for all we know today, moral terms may 
fail to refer. We can talk as if moral properties exist and use moral 
terms accordingly, just as we can talk as if Santa Claus exists and use 
the name accordingly. Nevertheless, just as it is questionable whether 
causal accounts of reference can provide an adequate account of non-
referring names, such as ‘Santa Claus’, it is not clear whether they can 
provide an account of moral terms. The causal account of reference car-
13 One might object here and claim that Earth and Moral Twin Earth might not 
belong to different possible worlds. However, the point still stands. If reference is not 
stable in a world, it surely is not stable across worlds.
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ries with it a presumption of existence. Such presumption is, as of now, 
not warranted when it comes to moral terms.
Suppose then that moral properties do exist and that they are ho-
meostatic properties of the kind Boyd suggests. Even then the causal 
theorist faces diffi culties. The causal account of names works well when 
we are dealing with individual objects or even a kind. But homeostat-
ic cluster properties are neither of those. Instead they are numerous 
properties that typically go together, or at least most of them. So far 
little or nothing has been said about how we can individuate and re-
identify such property clusters. In the case of water, our predecessors 
had a criteria for individuation and re-identifi cation. They could name 
a sample of water and claim that everything that bears the relevant 
sameness relation to the sample named is water. We have no idea as 
of how to do the same for moral properties. Until we have a workable 
criteria, even a rough one, as of how to identify  the relevant moral 
property clusters, it seems that we cannot apply the causal theory of 
reference to them. If we can, it is incumbent upon the new moral realist 
to show that we can do that.
In the end, then, the subjectivist does not need to rely on Moral 
Twin Earth to counter the new moral realist. The subjectivist is better 
off if she sticks closer to semantics and points out that the prominent 
Boyd-style new moral realist fails to preserve rigid designation in her 
account. When rigid designation is gone, so are synthetic defi nitions, 
and the latter are crucial to a successful new moral realist account.
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